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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tions would not alter the present law to great extent. With re-
gard to situations involving forgery of the drawer's signature88
or insufficient funds in the drawer's account,8 4 the Code is in
accord with the Louisiana cases which deny protection to the
drawee. As to material alterations the Code would bring Lou-
isiana in line with the jurisdictions which allow the drawee to
recover money paid. However, as to a holder in due course who
takes a draft accepted or certified by the drawee after such
alteration, the Code would change the majority rule by denying
the drawee recovery. In the case of a forgery of the payee's
endorsement, the Code is in accord with a pre-NIL Louisiana
decision which protected the drawee. 85 On the other hand, the
negligence test which has won approval in Louisiana 6 would be
abandoned if the Code is accepted. Louisiana courts have not
had opportunity to examine all of the questions that might arise
under the doctrine of Price v. Neal. Adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code would solve many of those unanswered ques-
tions and provide certainty in this area of the law.
John M. Shaw
The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instruments
Law of Louisiana-The Doctrine of Young v. Grote
Under the law merchant, the alteration of a negotiable in-
strument rendered it void, even if the hands of a holder in due
course,1 although a few jurisdictions allowed recovery on the
instrument as originally written.2 The effect of negligent execu-
tion which facilitates alteration of a negotiable instrument was
33. Security State Bank and Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 199 So. 472
(La. App. 1940).
34. Sowers Co. v. First National Bank, 6 La. App. 721 (1927) ; Schutte v.
Citizens Bank, 3 La. App. 547 (1926).
35. McCall v. Corning, 3 La. Ann. 409, 48 Am. Dec. 454 (1848).
36. Security State Bank and Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 199 So. 472 (La.
App. 1940).
1. Fordyce v. Kosminski, 49 Ark. 40, 3 S.W. 892 (1886) ; Knoxville National
Bank v. Clark, 51 Iowa 264, 1 N.W. 491 (1879) ; Bank of Herington v. Wangerin,
65 Kan. 423, 70 Pac. 330 (1902) ; Greenfield Savings Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass.
196, 25 Am. Rep. 67 (1877) ; see Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code on
Liability of Parties to Negotiable Instruments in Michigan, 53 Micu. L. REV. 179
(1954).
2. Dunbar v. Armor, 5 Rob. 1 (La. 1843) ; Burrows v. Klunk, 70 Md. 451,
14 Am. St. Rep. 371 (1889) ; Worrall v. Gheen, 39 Pa. 388 (1861).
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determined in 1825 in the leading English case of Young v.
Grote.3 In that case, Young drew checks on defendant Grote,
blank as to amount and date. Young left them with his wife
for the upkeep of his business and a clerk filled out one of the
checks and left spaces on the instrument which permitted sub-
sequent alteration. After the wife approved the amount of the
check, it was fraudulently altered by the clerk who inserted
figures in the spaces. Because the alteration was not apparent,
the drawee paid the check. In the suit instituted by Young
against the drawee, the court held that where an instrument is
so negligently drawn as to invite or facilitate alteration by the
insertion of words or figures,4 and such alteration is not ap-
parent, the drawee has the right to charge the drawer's account
for the amount of the check as altered.
The doctrine of Young v. Grote is founded on the idea that
it is the drawer's duty to prevent or at least discourage altera-
tion by drawing checks in a careful manner and that such duty
is an implied condition of his contract of deposit with the bank.5
Aside from the purpose of making the drawer bear the cost of
his negligence, justification for the doctrine may also be found
in the fact that it extricates the drawee bank from an apparent
dilemma. A bank may risk loss if it dishonors a check as well
as if it honors it. If it wrongfully dishonors a check, it is liable
in damages to the depositor for injury to his credit standing.6
If it honors an altered check, and the alteration is apparent, it
may not charge the drawer's account for the raised amount of
the check. 7 Thus, it seems only fair that banks, faced with this
determination, be protected against loss resulting from a
drawer's negligence.
One author8 has grouped the cases dealing with the effect
of negligent execution of completed negotiable instruments 9 into
3. 4 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P. 1827).
4. In Young v. Grote the court upheld the finding of the lower court that
Young had been guilty "of gross carelessness by causing his draft to be delivered
to the clerk in such a state that the latter ... did, by the insertion of other words,
make it appear to be the draft of Young for a larger sum, and that as he . . .
had caused the bankers to pay the larger sum, he [Young] was bound to make
good to them the loss."
5. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 1072 (1943).
6. Valley Nat. Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 121 P.2d 414 (1942) ; Browning
v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 197, 207 Pac. 462 (1922).
7. First National Bank v. Ketchum, 68 Okla. 104, 172 Pac. 81 (1918).
8. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 1065 (1943).
9. The entire problem of the effect of negligence on liability presupposes that
the instrument be complete in essential material, and that a material alteration
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three fact categories: (1) where the instrument has been exe-
cuted in such a manner that alteration is possible through the
insertion of words and figures; (2) where it is completed with
no blank spaces provided for qualifying clauses and such a clause
is subsequently added to the instrument; (3) where its execu-
tion is attended by careless acts other than leaving spaces on
the instrument - such as the failure to use a "protectograph"
machine.
The doctrine of Young v. Grote has been applied most fre-
quently in the first situation, dealing with the alteration of a
negotiable instrument by the insertion of words and figures.
The majority of jurisdictions in this country have adopted the
English view that a bank may lawfully charge the drawer's
account for the full amount of the instrument as altered, where
the loss can be attributed to the negligence of the drawer. 0 Con-
versely, where the alteration is apparent, a bank which honors
such an instrument may not raise the defense of negligent execu-
tion inasmuch as the loss was occasioned by its own negligence,
and not by the fault of the depositor."1
The second fact situation, wherein a negotiable instrument
having no blank space provided for qualifying clauses is altered
by the addition of such clause, has created no serious difficulty
for the courts. The decisions clearly indicate that the maker or
drawer is not liable on the instrument, for the reason that it is
impossible to fill in every space on the paper to prevent altera-
tion.' 2
In the third group of cases, negligence has been alleged be-
cause of the maker's failure to use some special device to pre-
vent alteration, such as a "protectograph" machine. 8 Generally,
the courts have been reluctant to extend the doctrine of Young v.
Grote this far, 4 probably because of the unreasonable burden it
would impose on the use of negotiable instruments. Thus, in one
decision the North Carolina court remarked: "[I]t would well-
has been facilitated through the drawer's negligence. Where the instrument is
not complete, the holder has "prima facie authority to complete it by filling up
the blanks." NIL § 14. When such an incomplete instrument is so filled up, the
filling does not constitute a material alteration. See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES
1070 (1943).
10. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 1068 (1943).
11. First National Bank v. Ketchum, 68 Okla. 104, 172 Pac. 81 (1918).
12 BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 1069, 1070 (1943).
13. Broad Street Bank v. National Bank, 183 N.C. 463, 112 N.E. 11 (1D22).
14. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 1074 (1943).
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nigh withdraw these instruments from ordinary use if any and
every one who issued them without these precautionary devices
would incur the risk of liability insisted on by plaintiff."'" Never-
theless, an Illinois court has held that a drawer who executed
a negotiable instrument partly in pencil was "guilty of gross
carelessness" and consequently was liable to a holder in due
course when the instrument was altered by erasures.' While
this group of cases implies that a high standard of care is not
required when it places an unreasonable burden on the use of
negotiable instruments, it is equally clear that a drawer will not
be relieved of liability when he could have prevented the altera-
tion with little or no effort.
Some decisions 17 have limited the doctrine of Young v. Grote
to the banker-depositor relation, while others,18 including those
of the Louisiana courts,' 9 have allowed recovery by a holder in
due course in suits brought against the negligent party. The
latter ruling, which extends protection of the doctrine of Young
v. Grote to a holder in due course, is difficult to defend since
there is no contract between the holder in due course and the
maker to warrant imposition of the duty of reasonable care.
But the courts which have extended the doctrine apparently have
not been favorably impressed with this argument. Thus, the
Louisiana court in Isnard v. Torres,20 citing Young v. Grote as
authority for allowing a holder in due course to recover from
the maker of a negligently drawn instrument, stated: "We think
the solution of the question is readily found by a recurrence to
the familiar principle, that where one of two parties, neither of
whom has acted dishonestly, must suffer, he shall suffer who
by his own act occasioned the confidence, and consequent injury
15. Broad Street Bank v. National Bank, 183 N.C. 463, 473, 112 N.E. 11, 16
(1922).
16. Harvey v. Smith, 55 Ill. 224, 226 (1870).
17. Knoxville National Bank v. Clark, 51 Iowa 264, 1 N.W. 491 (1879) ; Bank
of Herrington v. Wangerin, 65 Kan. 423, 70 Pac. 330 (1902) ; Burrows v. Klunk,
70 Md. 451, 14 Am. St. Rep. 371 (1889) ; Greenfield Savings Bank v. Stowell,
123 Mass. 196, 25 Am. Rep. 67 (1877) ; Goodman v. Eastman, 4 N.H. 455 (1828);
National Exchange Bank v. Lester, 194 N.Y. 461, 87 N.E. 779 (1909).
18. Yocum v. Smith, 63 Ill. 321, 14 Am. Rep. 120 (1871) ; Hackett v. First
National Bank, 114 Ky. 193, 70 S.W. 664 (1902) ; Scotland County National
Bank v. O'Connel, 23 Mo. App. 165 (1886) ; National Bank v. Nolting, 94 Va.
263, 26 S.E. 826 (1897).
19. Helwege v. Hibernia National Bank, 28 La. Ann. 520 (1876); Godchaux
v. Union National Bank, 28 La. Ann. 516 (1879) ; Isnard v. Torres, 10 La. Ann.
103 (1885).
20. 10 La. Ann. 103 (1885).
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of the others." 21 Similarly, it has been held that a bank which
certifies a check containing spaces and which fails to draw lines
through those spaces to prevent alteration is liable to a holder in
due course of the instrument as altered when the maker fraudu-
lently alters the check subsequent to the certification and ne-
gotiates it to the holder.22
The conflict existing among courts regarding the scope of
the doctrine of Young v. Grote was not substantially affected
by the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law.23 Although
the NIL allows a holder in due course of a materially altered
instrument to recover on the instrument according to its original
tenor,24 it makes no specific mention of what effect negligence
should have upon the liability of the parties. Therefore, under
section 196 of the NIL, the law merchant still governs.25
The Uniform Commercial Code
UCC section 3-406 states: "Any person who by his neg-
ligence substantially contributes to a material alteration of
the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signa-
ture is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of au-
thority against a holder in due course or against a drawee
or other payor who pays the instrument in good faith. '26
21. Id. at 104. 'Prior to the adoption of the NIL the Louisiana court had
found privity of contract between the holder of a check and the drawee bank,
despite common law decisions denying such right on the basis that a chose in
action is not assignable. See Gordon & Gomila v. Muchler, 34 La. Ann. 604 (1882),
overruling Case v. Henderson, 23 La. Ann. 49, 8 Am. Rep. 590 (1871), which
had accepted the common law rule. This was in accord with civilian principles.
See LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2642 et seq. (1870). However, this ruling was changed
in M. Feitel House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 2 La. App. 118,
120-21 (1925), affirmed, 159 La. 752, 106 So. 292 (1925), where the court held
that adoption of NIL § 189 overruled this line of cases and established the com-
mon law rule requiring acceptance or certification. The question of contract did
not arise in Isnard v. Torres, but the ruling is in accord with the pre-NIL prin-
ciple, although differing to the extent that in the Young v. Grote situation there
is acceptance.
22. Helwege v. Hibernia National Bank, 28 La. Ann. 520 (1876) ; Godchaux
v. Union National Bank, 28 La. Ann. 516 (1876).
23. LA. R.S. 7:1-195 (1950).
24. NIL § 124; Arnold v. Wood, 127 Ark. 234, 191 S.W. 960 (1917) ; Com-
mercial Bank v. Arden, 177 Ky. 520, 197 S.W. 951 (1917).
25. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 1190 (Beutel ed. 1948).
26. UCC as amended by SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF
TEXT AND COMMENTS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PART I, at 21, UCC
3-406 (1955). The amendment consisted of deleting the concluding phrase
"and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or
payor's business" from the 1952 draft of the section. A similar deletion was made
in UCC section 3-302. The reason offered for the change is that it "is intended
to make clear that the doctrine of an objective standard of good faith, exempli
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This section of the Uniform Commercial Code recognizes the
doctrine of Young v. Grote, thereby dealing specifically with a
problem on which the NIL was notably silent.27 In addition, it
enlarges the sphere of the application of the doctrine to include
a holder in due course or a payer who technically might not be
considered a drawee.28 In states whose courts have already in-
cluded a holder in due course within the ambit of the doctrine, 2
this section would create no substantial change in the law. How-
ever, in jurisdictions where the doctrine has not been recog-
nized, 0 or where it has been sharply limited to the drawer-
drawee relation,81 the adoption of the Code would broaden the
liability of the parties to a negotiable instrument. The section
repudiates the view that the liability of a drawer of a negli-
gently executed negotiable instrument may flow only from a
contract of deposit with a bank. On the contrary, the section
adopts the view that "the maker or drawer voluntarily enters
into a relation with later holders which justifies his responsi-
bility" and is liable on the instrument as altered.
Under UCC 3-406 negligence is immaterial unless it "sub-
stantially contributes" to the alteration. Since the section pro-
vides no test to determine when negligence "substantially con-
tributes" to the alteration, the issue of negligence in each case
is a question of fact.33 Although the negligence "must afford an
opportunity of which advantage is in fact taken, ' 34 the section
does not impose an unusual standard of care on the maker or
drawer. Section 3-406 was not intended to change decisions
holding that there is no duty to use a protectograph machine,
indelible inks, or similar devices to prevent alteration. 5 Even
if the negligence is not substantial, the holder in due course still
has protection under the Code. Section 3-407 permits recovery
fied by the case of Gill v. Cubbitt, 3 B. & C. 466 [107 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.
1824)], is not intended to be incorporated in Article 3." Id. at 18.
27. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw 1190 (Beutel ed. 1948).
28. UCC 3-406, comment.
29. See notes 18 and 19 supra.
30. Annot., 22 A.L.R. 1139 (1923).
31. See note 17 supra.
32. UCC 3-406, comment.
33. Ibid. That the issue of a drawer's negligence is a jury question, and not a
question of law, was decided in the case of Timbel v. Garfield National Bank,
106 N.Y. Supp. 497, 121 App. Div. 870 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
34. UCC 3-406, comment.
35. Ibid.
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by a holder in due course on an altered instrument according to
its original tenor, thus preserving his rights under theNIL.3
6
Aside from negligence which contributes to a material altera-
tion, a person is liable under the Code on a negotiable instru-
ment if his negligence substantially contributes to "the making
of an unauthorized signature." 87 Thus, a person using a signa-
ture stamp would be liable on a negotiable instrument if his
negligent manner of keeping the stamp contributed substantially
to the making of an unauthorized signature on the instrument. 8
Similarly, the section is equally applicable to instances where a
person's negligence contributes to the making of a forged or
other unauthorized signature of another. Typical instances of
this might occur where a check is negligently mailed to a person
having the same name as the payee,89 where the drawer's neg-
ligence consists in his failure to discover and prevent the
issuance of fraudulently executed instruments bearing forged
endorsements,40 or where the drawer negligently surrenders pos-
session of checks to a forger who had the means of misleading
others as to his right to endorse. 41
In conclusion, it would seem that the effect of the Uniform
Commercial Code on the doctrine of Young v. Grote can be
measured only by the degree of change its adoption would cause
in the law of each individual jurisdiction. Since Louisiana is in
accord with those jurisdictions that have extended the doctrine
to include the holder in due course within its protection, adop-
tion of the Code in this state would constitute statutory recogni-
tion of an accepted rule. In addition, doing so would undoubtedly
lend a degree of clarity to an area of the law where conflict
existed previously under the law merchant and the Negotiable
Instruments Law.
William C. HoUier
36. See note 24 supra.
37. UCC 3-406, comment; see Steinheimer, Impact of the Oommercial Code
Liability of Parties to Negotiable Instruments in Michigan, 53 MIOH. L. REV.
170, 182 (1954).
38. See note 37 8upra.
39. UCC 3-406, comment.
40. Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home Say. Bank, 252 Mich.
163, 233 N.W. 185 (1930) ; see Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code on
Liability of Parties to Negotiable Instruments in Michigan, 53 MIOH. L. REv.
170, 182 (1954).
41. Peninsular State Bank v. First National Bank, 245 Mich. 179, 222 N.W.
157 (1928) ; see Seinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code on U4&biitv of Par-
ties to Negotiable Instruments in Michigan, 53 MIOn. L. REV. 170, 182 (1954).
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